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Abstract 
We show that bonuses are efficient in terms of effort exertion and greater in noisier 
environments. This could explain the prevalence of bonuses in the financial sector, which is 
characterised by flat hierarchies and inherently noisy environments. Policies to restrict bonuses 
should be implemented cautiously since they may imply undesirable efficiency effects. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we ask a straightforward question: Why are worker bonuses so prevalent? To this 
question we offer a simple yet novel solution: Firms can use bonuses to attain first-best effort 
levels. Thus, we demonstrate that bonuses can be added to the growing list of optimal payment 
structures that have emerged in the literature on asymmetric information, where firms cannot 
directly observe effort. Our model is rooted in the share cropping-tenant debates of the 1950s. 
These found that charging workers a flat fee and then allowing them to retain the residual rent 
out-performs sharecropping as a contractual arrangement [Johnson (1950), Cheung (1969) and 
Reid (1973)].  
A seminal paper especially relevant to our model is Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) 
tournament model, which demonstrated that relative performance rewards in the workplace can 
be used by hierarchical firms to elicit efficient effort levels. Noise plays a particularly important 
role in the Lazear and Rosen paper and the large tournament literature that followed. An 
increase in noise reduces the marginal effect of worker effort on the probability of winning the 
tournament and attaining promotion. This reduction in potency induces workers to moderate 
effort and to instead ride their luck in the more random environment created by the increased 
noise. But firms do not sit idly by on the demand side. Instead they increase the wage spread 
between winners and losers to counterbalance the adverse effect of noise.  
It has been long thought that such an intuition is restricted to firms that offer 
promotions. Yet, in what follows we show that such a presumption is incorrect and 
demonstrate, for the first time, that the intuition can be extended beyond promotions in 
hierarchical firms. Indeed, we show that bonuses in firms with flat hierarchies play a similar 
incentivising role as wage spreads in tournaments. We establish that a simple bonus structure 
can attain first-best efficiency and that whilst increases in noise reduce the level of effort ceteris 
paribus, firms can perfectly counteract this by offering larger bonuses.  
It is important to note that promotions are unlike bonuses in that they usually entail a 
change in tasks. Pergamit and Veum (1999) find that 85% of workers who are promoted 
experience an increase in their job responsibilities, and similarly in Kosteas (2011) where 65% 
of promotions lead to an increase in supervisory tasks. Whilst added responsibility may 
enhance job satisfaction, it might also come with strings attached, potentially increasing 
workloads and reducing workplace well-being – see Diriwaechter and Shvartsman (2018). Any 
increase in remuneration that follows a promotion is not, therefore, a perfect measure of the 
associated effort incentives. Such ambiguities do not typically arise with bonuses, which are 
normally awarded ex post subject to a standard being attained with no other conditions 
attached. 
Whilst it is possible that the firm could reframe a bonus as a promotion, with no change 
in associated job responsibilities, there may be good reasons for it not to do so. In a world of 
asymmetric information, a firm may hesitate to publically promote its workers to then face 
competition from its competitors who might come in to tempt the workers away. This is the 
central tenet of the market-based tournament theory literature based on the seminal paper by 
Waldmann (1984) and followed by, among others, Gibbs (1995), Zabojnik and Bernhardt 
(2001) and Ghosh and Waldman (2010). A better incentive scheme that avoids worker 
poaching may be to pay externally unobservable bonuses. Thus we argue the firm, with a flat 
hierarchy in terms of tasks, may opt for unobservable bonuses to observable (reframed) 
promotions when it faces an external threat of worker poaching. 
One would expect that any mechanism which attains efficiency to be widespread in the 
economy. For efficient outcomes facilitate the full exploitation of all gains to trade. Bonuses 
are indeed common, especially in industries with flat hierarchies and noisy environments, such 
as the financial sector, and where the downsides of tournamounts are insurmountable [Bell and 
Van Reenen (2014)].1 The dearth of academic studies investigating the effort efficiency of 
bonuses is therefore surprising. 
Whilst some studies have looked at how bonuses can enhance efficiency, none propose, 
as do we, that the use of bonuses can attain full efficiency. Thus, none provide the same strong 
argument for their widespread use. Instead they rely on efficiency enhancements. An example 
of this literature is Kim (1997) who shows that bonus payments combined with piece rates can 
generate effort enhancing outcomes under limited liability. In contrast, our model considers a 
cleaner bonus system comprising a fixed wage (independent of output) and an output threshold 
triggered bonus.2 
Other strands of literature compare bonuses and efficiency wages – see, for example, 
MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), Yang (2008) and Maestri (2012). Some investigate altruism 
and show that this shifts incentives from sticks/dismissals to carrots/bonuses [Dur and Tichem 
(2015)]. Herweg et al. (2010) demonstrate the second-best optimality of bonuses when workers 
are averse to loss. Bakó and Kálecz-Simon (2013) study bonus quotas within a Bertrand 
duopoly. Imhof and Krӓkel (2014) investigate when pooling bonuses benefit firms. Ekinci et 
al. (2019) study bonus within market-based tournament models and demonstrate that bonuses 
enhance efficiency.  
There are, of course, other arguments that can explain the use of bonuses. One of these 
is similar to the often-repeated claim that a key advantage of tournaments over other 
performance related pay (PRP) schemes is the lower monitoring costs they entail. The same 
argument can be applied to bonus systems.3 Bonuses are common in non-hierarchical firms 
where tournaments are not an option and may be preferable to PRP for cost of monitoring 
reasons. Another reason lays in the binary nature of bonuses. PRP rewards performance 
monotonically whereas bonuses are only triggered after a certain threshold has been achieved. 
Thus, bonuses are arguably more likely than other forms of PRP when threshold standards are 
of critical importance to firms.  
The binary modelling approach that we adopt, which is of such critical importance to 
our results, is usually overlooked in the literature. Indeed, it is usually the case that bonuses are 
modelled as a continuous form of PRP – see, for instance, Bénabou and Tirole. (2016). More 
recently, Enknci et al. (2019) set out a two-period model where the bonus rate is set dependent 
on, and continuous in, output. This entails the bonus rate being set such that the worker receives 
the full additional productivity that arises from increases in effort. Our model contrasts to this 
approach and is important in making the previously un-stated link between bonuses and 
 
1 Flat organisatioal hierarchies offer a number of benefits. They elevates employees’ sense of responsibility and remove 
excessive management layers thererby improving the coordination and speed of communication between employees. The 
potential downsides of tournaments include excessive pay inequality, discouragement of lesser able workers and selfish, 
colluding or sabotaging behaviour. It has also been found that female workers may be disinclined to fully participate in 
tournaments even when they are more skilled and capable than their male counterparts - see Sheremeta (2016)]. 
2 Our model has more in common with Oyer (2000) who, like Kim (1997) but in contrast to us, considers the special case of 
limited liability. 
3 Our argument that bonuses enable firms to reduce monitoring costs is also a central theme of the efficiency wage literature, 
such as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bulow and Summers (1986). The focus in this literature, however, differs from the 
present paper by concentrating on equilibrium unemployment. 
tournaments. Like binary tournaments where the worker is either promoted or not, bonuses are 
also binary in our set up and either paid or not. 
Our model can help to answer a well-known puzzle stated by among others Prendercast 
(1999) and Salanié (2003) that concerns the relatively complex contractual predictions of 
incentive in theory is not reflected in the relatively simple contractual forms that exists. 
Whereas Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) argued that pay should be 
monotonically increasing in performance, evidence from the labour market suggest that this is 
far from the universal contractual form in the labour market. Indeed, the binary nature of 
bonuses stand in sharp contrast. Some have tried to explain binary payment schemes, see de 
Meza and Webb (2007) and Herweg et al. (2010), by appealing to loss aversion, where bonuses 
are paid for good performance, but no penalties are incurred for bad performance. We rely on 
the much simpler modelling scheme outlined below where it is demonstrated that bonuses can 
generate efficient effort levels. This, we argue is a powerful argument for their widespread use. 
We venture that our model, whilst simple, is not simplistic and has important policy 
implications. With increasing pressures on government to restrict financial sector bonuses, it 
suggests some caution.4 For whilst capping bonuses may be beneficial for income distribution 
reasons, it may come at the expense of efficiency.  
2. The Model 
We assume that output, , depends on worker effort, , and a state contingent variable, , 
vis.  where  and . We interpret  as ‘luck’ – specifically, a 
draw from a uniform distribution with a lower and upper bound  and  respectively such 
that , where the spread  is a measure reflecting ‘noise’. The larger 
this spread, the noisier the work environment. The firm, which observes neither effort nor luck, 
pays its (single) worker a fixed wage, , and a bonus,  , contingent on a given output 
standard, , being met.5 The worker can achieve this threshold by a combination of luck and 
exertion. It follows that the critical level of luck, , which the worker needs to trigger the 
bonus, is a function of effort vis. . This critical level is declining in effort 
since . Thus, the probability of securing the bonus is 
characterised by , where . With risk neutral 
workers and a cost of effort function , where  and , expected worker 
utility is . Worker optimisation requires: 
 
4 Such pressures have been reflected in policy. For instance, in the aftermath of the financial crisis the European Union 
introduced legislation in 2014 capping bankers’ bonuses to 100% of the value of fixed pay. 
5 This paper emphasises the binary nature of bonuses, in contrast to the literature where bonuses are often assumed to be 
continuous in standards. To retain simplicity and clarity, we have modelled the binary aspect of pay as a single bonus paid out 
when an exogenously determined standard is achchied, rather than a series of different bonuses paid out at different standards. 
Whilst we do not endogenize the standard, it would in practice be chosen to maximise profit subject to the participation 
constraint. Such an approach would first determine how effort supplied depends on the standard. Since , then 
. It follows from total differentiation of (1) that 
. Thus, effort is increasing in the standard. A similar first-
order condtion to (3b) could then be derived for the choice of the standard. In order not to  distract from our main analysis, we 
have chosen to omtit this from the paper. Endogenous standards and continuous bonuses are discussed in Murphy and Jensen 
(2011). 
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We now derive the first of our key results: 
Proposition 1.  Worker effort is decreasing in noise. 
Proof. Total differentiation of the first-order condition (1) implies 
.6 
QED. 
Thus, workers in a flat hierarchy respond to an increase in noise by reducing their effort. As 
such, Proposition 1 provides a clear parallel to tournament theory that produces a similar effect. 
In both that literature and here, workers are more inclined to gamble and ride their luck when 
noise levels are5 high. In noisier work environments, workers find the return to their effort is 
low and so shade exertion. However, it is also the case that: 
Proposition 2.  Worker effort is increasing in the bonus. 
Proof. Total differentiation of the first-order condition (1) implies 
. 
QED. 
Thus, irrespective of noise, the worker will always work harder the larger the bonus, ceteris 
paribus. Intuitively, the bonus acts as an incentive mechanism that the firm can exploit when it 
maximises expected profit . With the worker having an 
outside option of , we define a Lagrangian, , such that the constrained optimisation 
problem facing the firm is given by: 
 (2) 
Satisfaction of (2) leads us to: 
Proposition 3.  The firm’s use of bonuses yields the efficient level of effort, . 
Proof. Disregarding corner solutions, we have: 
  (3a) 
 
6 The second-order condition associated with (1), , follows from 
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Substituting 	from (3a) into (3b) implies  
to obtain the required efficiency outcome. 
QED. 
This new result, which adds bonuses to PRP schemes in attaining first-best efficiency, where 
the expected return to effort equals the cost of effort, is accompanied by some straightforward 
intuition that follows from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. These illustrate, respectively, that 
worker effort decreases with the level of noise and increases with the level of the bonus. Thus, 
as Proposition 3 shows, the firm can use the latter effect to perfectly counterbalance the former 
and thus achieve a first-best efficient outcome. This ability to deliver first-best efficiency in 
flat hierarchies when there is asymmetric information regarding luck/noise may explain why 
bonuses are so common in the labour market. 
3. Concluding Comment 
This paper has shown that bonuses are efficient in terms of effort exertion and that bonuses are 
greater in noisy environments. Whilst this is of considerable interest in itself, it could also help 
explain stylised facts of the prevalence of bonuses in the financial sector, which is characterised 
by flat hierarchies whose environment is inherently noisy. It further has an important public 
policy implication on how that industry is regulated. Policy makers should exercise caution in 
respect to regulation that restricts bonuses as this may have undesirable efficiency effects. 
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